Reports:

Municipal election in Iran, a test of legitimacy for the regime

          Iran staged its second-ever municipal-council elections on 28 February.  Campaigning for the elections began on 20 February and continued until midnight on 26 February, where candidates competed for some 168,000 positions in cities, villages, and townships.

Between 35 million eligible voters (according to the Plan and Budget Organization) and 39 million eligible voters (according to the State Registration Office and IRNA) were eligible to vote in the previous municipal elections in 1999. The voting age at that time was 16. The voting age was subsequently lowered to 15, and more than 44.5 million Iranians -- everyone born before 8 June 1986 -- were eligible to vote in the May 2001 presidential election.  This time every Iranian born before 28 February 1988 was eligible to vote.          As of July 2002, the population was estimated to be 66,622,704, and 68.4 percent of the population was estimated to be 15 or older.  This meant that there were approximately 45.6 million eligible voters.  In 1999 council elections, about 64 percent of the eligible voters turned out to vote.  Many inside and abroad dissidents and political parties supported the elections as a way to empower the electorate and other elected bodies; however, the inability and lack of progress by the so-called reformist President, and the parliament has disillusioned the general public that any reform is impossible within the current establishment.

The opener atmosphere in capital that resulted in large turnout in previous three elections proved extremely fruitless; however, outside the capital, pressure has remained in effect so the voters have tried to use this election as their only resort to bring change to the way their daily affairs are governed, and exhaust all possibilities.  The voter turnout outside the capital was broader.  Still, according to official figures, voter turnout was less than 50 percent.

However, according to BBC News “the turnout in Tehran was low, only around 25 percent, indicating disillusionment with politics and the slow pace of change in the country.” Others have estimated that the turnout in the city may have been as little as 15 percent.  This is the result of public frustration over the pace of reform, and according to BBC “this poll was seen as a kind of referendum on the popularity of the president and his programme of peaceful and legal reform.”

Electorate in the Kurdish areas expressed very little enthusiasm registering, to the extent that the number of people running for office, this time, did not even reach 20 percent of the 1^st local elections.  The strong disillusionment with the system resulted in the low turnout rate, below the national average.  In many townships and villages because not enough candidates volunteered to register, the regime started to threaten people; so as if they did not register, they would be barred from government services and posts.

          The voters have, this time, tried first to penalize those whom they had elected in the previous elections, and prove the illegitimacy of this regime by staying away from the polls.  It should be noted that the boycott of many political parties this time had also tremendous effect on public opinion.  Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan in a communiqué called upon the people of Kurdistan to refrain from voting; “We hope that not only in Kurdistan but in the rest of Iran, those who value their dignity and enjoy public respect do not register for the second so-called council elections, so as not to become an instrument of legitimacy for the dictatorship of juriscouncil…We hope that the day will come that the people of Iran freely elect, and the peoples’ representatives embody the people’s will.”  Many officials from both camps called the turnout a ‘national tragedy’.  Hopefully, the result will force the regime to accept a national referendum to vote on the kind of government structure that the people would like to establish.

Louis Joinet: In Iran, there exists freedom of expression;

However, those who speak out, get in trouble.

Louis Joinet, the head of the UN arbitrary detention examining team briefed reporters in a press conference following his team’s return from two weeks of investigations and visits of Iran’s prisons.  Louis Joinet stated:  His team in this mission, have met many government officials, and also visited several imprisoned politicians (among them several detained lawyers) in Evin prison, meeting overall100 prisoners.  Aside from the notorious Evin prison, they also visited several other prisons.  Mr. Joinet said that the prisoners, especially political prisoners, are faced with serious impediments; they are held in solitary confinements that are, in fact, prisons within prison.  Mr. Joinet stated that in Iran people are jailed without any grounds.  He also commented, “The Iranian judicial system is alien from the culture of attorney and defense lawyer.” 

On the existence of freedom of expression in Iran, Louis Joinet said: “In Iran the problem is not the lack of freedom of expression, rather troubles arise when political opinions are actually expressed.”  Louis Joinet referred to a few examples of violating the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Iran is a signatory.  He also stated that in their meeting with the prisoners and detainees, they have concluded that there are absurdity between the sentences and the offenses. 

In regards to the practicality of defense attorney in Iran’s judicial system, Louis Joinet said: “The freedom to choose defense attorney for political prisoners is much more restrained.  Most of the lawyers who come forward to defend jailed political, also end up in jail preparing their final defense arguments.  We have realized that the lawyers defending the detainees, because they have criticized the ill-treatment of their client or criticized the judicial system, have been questioned.  Most judges prevent lawyers from being present at the hearings, even in preliminary hearings.”

Louis Joinet questioned the existence of the cleric and military courts in Iran, and said that the logic of their existence is unclear.  

The Execution of Democratic Activists Continues…

By: Wurya Hussieni

The year 2002 for the people of Kurdistan was the augmentation of the same old oppression that most of it has been legitimized because of the governmental system ruling over our people; most importantly, the year 2002 was the year of the imprisonment of political activists, and the year of execution and elimination of Kurdish freedom-activists and intellectuals.  The execution of the imprisoned activists was in effect till the last remaining days of 2002.  Habibullah Tanhaeyan’s body was returned to his family on 12 October 2002.  In 6, 7 and 14 of October, Salah Godarzi, Hamza Ghaderi and Khalid Shawghi were executed in the regime’s prisons respectively, accused of collaborating with PDKI.  Mansure maroufi, another PDKI activist was gunned down in the centre of Bokan city (Iranian Kurdistan) by the intelligence forces in 15 November 2002.  Just within the last year, a large numbers of civilians from the borderous urban and rural areas have become victims of regime’s barbaric policies of terror.  The sum of these and many more atrocities committed by the regime in Kurdistan deserve some deliberation that will be laid out from several angles.

The executions that were carried out in these period, first and foremost, confronts us with the existence of the regime’s philosophy and thinking that justifies and invests in these executions.  After more than two decades of this regime’s ruling, and considering its records, it has become clear for every intact mind that regime’s doctrine is based on eradicating dissidents consisting of every kind of outsider voice, and even ‘legalizing’ it; the regime’s constitution is derived from this philosophy that is full of injustice, and neglecting national, cultural and religious differences.  Apart from this ‘doctrine’, Khomeini, the founder of the establishment, had had a crucial role in the delivery of the execution verdicts of the opponents on many occasions.  Proof, the mass executions of political prisoners in the summer of 1988 would be enough.  Khomeini in a verdict for the execution of political prisoners writes: ‘Those in the prisoners of the country who insist on their opposition are infidels and must be hanged.’  Realistically, this ‘doctrine’ is considered as one of the scariest ‘doctrine’ of this era that is a continuation of the middle-age mentality.  Furthermore, Khatami (the current so-called reformist President) also stated two years ago that any attempt to change the constitution is considered as treason, unaware of the fact that the preservation of the current statues and their implementation in Iranian society connote disrespect to the dignity of every Iranian, and a legal justification to the killings and executions of the people of this country.

The other aspect is the position and reaction of the world community, especially some international humanitarian organizations, and some individuals and groups within the country against the execution of these Kurdish activists.  It should be unambiguously admitted that the latest executions did not follow much criticism from international community especially the European Union.  Of course, the European understanding of Iran in 2002 was fundamentally fallow; leaving Iran out from the list of the United Nations Commission for Human Rights as a regime that must be continuously monitored and scrutinized was the principal blunder.  Still, the European states without considering the rising number of execution in Iran, have been striving to present a contemporary image of this regime to preserve their commercial interests.  It has proved that the European countries, before being concerned about the violation of human rights in Iran, are worried about the loss of Iranian market.  In general, leaving Iran out of the list of the countries that must be monitored by the Commission is the result of agreements of a number of countries with the government in Iran, not the improvement of human rights conditions and abandoning terrorism sponsorship.  Because, in this period, aside from the execution of Kurdish activists, dozens of Kurdish merchants, under the disguise of ‘smugglers’ have been murdered, and at national level the detainment of journalists, attacks on students, and etc… continues.

In fact, if criticism is directed at countries and organizations defending human rights on their indifferenceness towards the executions, it is not an offense if the indifferences of the defenders of ‘civil society’ and those so-called reformers are also pointed out.  It is more than five years that they have been jiggling around with terms such as democracy, civil society and so on and so forth…and also consider themselves as public representatives; however, in regards to the execution of Kurdish citizens, they have chosen to remain silent.  In fact, remaining silent in the face of executions of political prisoners for what ever reason and under whatever circumstances is based on neglecting Kurdish aspirations that these activists were executed for.  We must understand that the execution and terror of any Kurdish activist is not just about the physical extermination of individuals, rather, it is an attempt for the elimination of the forerunners of struggle, and extinguishing the brave voices of those activists that struggle for rights and freedom of Kurds for more than half a century.  For instance, ‘Kurdish deputies’ in the Iranian Islamic Council Assembly (Majlis) who have not been heedless of condemning Israeli policies in Palestine, Turkish in Kurdistan and the U.S. in Afghanistan, must regard this reality that they are the product of a society that the wills of its population is ignored and violated daily, and the activists of Kurdish national movement are eliminated.  As the result, neglecting this important matter is neglecting the rights and aspirations of a people.

No doubts, the execution of the Kurdish activists has neither been the regime’s first attempt, nor will it remain the last attack on the progressive movement of Kurdistan; furthermore, these executions are regime’s explicit confession to the prospect of advancing national-general movement in Kurdistan that has been effective against the regime for more than two decades, a ‘bitter’ fact, which has also been generally denied by the officials.  Still, this new wave of executions, contrary to all the bluffs of Yahya Rahim-Safavi (Commander-in-chief of the Islamic Republic Revolutionary Corps or Pasdaran) is a sign of popularity and activeness of Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan; a party whose members are in regime’s prisons, also a sign of Party’s devotion to the process of freedom-seeking struggle in Iran and Kurdistan.

Regardless, we should not forget that these executions are conducted in times that resistance and abhorrence of the people of Kurdistan is becoming routine that examples of this was the opposition of the fed-up people of the cities of Piranshar, Mahabad and Kermashan against the regime’s policies in the region.  Kurdish students along with the nation-wide student movement enjoy an important role, and today on the world stage Kurdish cry, in general, has strong support; consequently, the execution of Kurdish activists in prisons that are intended to frighten the disillusioned People of Kurdistan has confronted the regime with various obstacles, far more than overwhelming the populace struggle.

Once again, along with condemning the execution of democratic activists, we renew our pledges that we continue to remain the pioneers of the demands of the people of Kurdistan, and the fulfiller of the will of those honourable martyrs.

Socialist International:

Meeting of the Socialist International Council, Rome, 20-21 January 2003

RESOLUTION ON THE IRANIAN KURDS

The Council of the Socialist International, meeting in Rome on 20-21 January 2003,

Taking note of the developments that have taken place during these last years in Iran,

¨       Encourages all forces in favour of democracy and human rights to continue on the road towards change and reform;

¨       Strongly condemns the grave violations of human rights and democratic freedoms committed by the enemies of reform in that country, including the closing down of several newspapers, the arrest of journalists, intellectuals and students who favour change, and the death penalties and execution of Kurdish militants;

¨       Denounces the repression against the Kurds in Iran and underlines the need to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem in Iran;

¨       Reasserts its support for the legitimate rights of the Kurds in Iran and its solidarity with the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), a member of the Socialist International which remains faithful to democratic values and to a peaceful solution to Kurdish problem in Iran.

Press Release:

The execution of another prisoner of consciousness by the regime in Iran

Habibullah Tanhaeyan, 41 years old, married with three children, from the city of Sanandaj was detained on 11 December 2002 by the regime’s intelligence elements in the city of Sanandaj.  He had been taken into custody several times before and held for several months on each occasion by the regime in Iran accused of having ties with Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan.  His detainment this time - after four days of interrogation and torture - resulted in his execution on 15 December 2002 convicted of similar accusations.  The deceased body of this brave activist, bearing the signs of excessive torture, was returned to his family four days after his execution.

Such a murderous crime of the regime is carried out when a European Union delegation was in the midst of dialogue with the regime in Iran over human rights violations, as well as respect for the rights of the Kurds.

Along with expressing deep abhorrence to the freedom restraining and suppressing policies of the regime, PDKI conveys its sincere condolences to the family of forgone Habibullah, all the people of Sanandaj and the surroundings.  We hope that the blood of this triumphant martyr, and others alike, have not been exhausted in attaining peace and freedom, and their legacy have not been washed out; rather, thousands of city youth eager for freedom continue their path and seek justice for all the crimes committed by this regime.

Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan

24 December 2002

An Interview with Secretary-general

“The world community has well realized that there is no possibility of fundamental reform in Iran under the reign of Islamic Republic.”

“Iranian students have proved that they have taken further steps towards their revolutionary tendency, and the rulers of this regime cannot retreat them any further.”

“We must accept this reality that government [western] officials confront the issue of our struggle and other nations alike more cautiously.”

This is a portion of Secretary-general’s interview with the Party’s official paper, ‘KURDISTAN’ following his return to Kurdistan from Europe.

Q: In your recent trip, you had met a number of government officials and policy-makers.  What was the framework of your discussions, and what was their perception of the current Iranian circumstances and Kurdish people.

A: The context of the discussions are usually similar, meaning, when we talk to the people abroad, whether those with official responsibility in various government levels, such as the officials in foreign ministries, those who are policy-makers, or whether the member of assemblies or party leaders, the main purpose is to expose the condition of Kurdish struggle and the freedom-seeking struggle of all Iranians, the condition of the country and the government, especially the violation of human rights.  We also attempt to attract their attention to the just struggle that the Kurdish people and other nationalities of Iran carry forward; however, to the point that it concerns the position of Westerners, what we have observed can be an instance; whether we meet several parties and organizations can be considered as examples.  When we sit with officials at foreign offices we might, more or less, conclude that the policies of these offices of the governments might be of the same nature.  The context of the discussions differs in relation to the various government representatives and other non-governmental institutions.  We must accept this reality that government [western] officials confront the issue of our struggle and other nations alike more cautiously.  It is quite understandable because of their relations with these governments.  Those who are parliamentarians, journalists or representatives of a political party who are not part of a government can more freely and explicitly express their opinions.  Most importantly, all and each considering their status, and to the extent that their positions allow them, support both the Kurdish struggle and the nation-wide struggle for freedom and democracy; furthermore, they are concerned about the country’s human rights conditions; however, an issue that was new for me at this trip, was the fact that the majority of the people that we have met were aware of the situation in Iran better than ever.  The uncertainty that they had in their division of reformists and pragmatists was all over this time.  They had all admitted this, and believed that we as Iranians or as the Kurds of Iran have better understood the reality of our country and the ruling establishment; mainly, because they have often been briefed by the President or other officials; they have trusted them enough to open an account fro them, unaware of the fact that the President in a country such as current Iran can not be a decision-maker, rather, most of the shots are called by those who have no clear accountability.  Now, they have realized that in Iran under the ruling of the current clerics, there are no possibilities of fundamental change.  One might openly spell out these truth, while others refrain from expressing them overtly; however, such a feeling can be easily seen in those who have realized that by bringing change in Iran, both the government and the ruling system must change, quite contrary to the belief that apparently this system is able to create change and bring fundamental reform, something impractical.

Q: While you were away, several of PDKI activists were executed in the regime’s prisons.  What was the response of humanitarian organizations in this regard?

A: Surprisingly, exactly the day that our members were executed, we were scheduled to meet the UNCHR headquarters in Geneva.  Unaware of their executions, we had the list of these prisoners, and informed the UNCHR officials that the lives of these prisoners are in danger because they have been sentenced to death, so we asked them to take necessary measures to revoke the verdicts.  We also asked them to take necessary measures for the remaining prisoners who have been abducted by the regime for more than 5 years, so at least their where-abouts are known.  Following our departure, we were informed of the barbarity, so we contacted them again to notify them of the executions; we told them that it is time that something needs to be done to save the lives of other prisoners…I must state that aside from Iranian organizations, other human rights defenders also condemned the executions, particularly, Dr. Abdulkarim Lahiji [the head of the League of Human Rights Defense in Iran) published a statement and made a press conference in solidarity.  However, the position of international community was not sufficient enough to be responsive to such crimes.  Several other members were also sentenced to death after the barbaric executions that I hope their verdicts will be revoked.  In my opinion, the international reaction to the killings was far less than expected.  It could be because the world community has faced more controversial issues, especially the U.S. and Iraq conflict which has shifted much of the focus.

Q:   At what level is Party’s relationship with other countries and humanitarian organizations?

A: I can confidently state that our relations with these legal, social and political centres and specialists are in a favourable state as usual.  We have been greeted warmly by all those whom we have met…Overall, I can say that the relations that we have are satisfactory; however, there is always room for further improvement.

Tributes:

Speech made by Mustafa Hijri, member of PDKI's politburo on the 'Peshmarga Day', Kurdish Freedom-fighters Day

"The armed struggle, despite costing many lives, has been the most effective means of reviving the Kurdish identity in Iran..."

Honourable Leadership Council!

Cadres and courageous Kurdish Freedom Fighters, the PISHMARA force!

Dear Sisters and Brothers!

Ladies and Gentlemen!

            26 of Sarmavaz,(December 17) the “PISHMARG Day” is a good occasion to commemorate and honour “PISHMARGA”, those who sacrifice their lives to free the Kurdish nation.

            No doubts, the ultimate freedom of an oppressed nation depends directly on all kinds of sacrifices that the individual members of that nation make.  It means that the children of the nation make sacrifices based on their different life style, degree of understanding, and above all, the level of patriotic affection and understanding of their rights within a given society; thus, it is a duty that members of nations struggle for freedom. 

            Once a nation is librated and freedom is totally embraced by that nation, there are always special members of society who stand out more than others whom ultimately are remembered for their outstanding sacrifices that they have made.  The Kurdish nation, despite having a long history of sacrifice, is among those nations still under oppression. The brave people who started joining PISHMERGA force from and during the Republic of Kurdistan in 1945, and since then have been sacrificing their lives courageously are among the most honoured and well-respected members of Kurdish society. “PISHMERGA” to Kurds in itself represents the highest level of sacrifice, untainted and liberator. This sage of purity has been achieved by a long history of struggle against their oppressors. During the long struggle against oppression many PISHMERGAS have lost their lives; they sacrificed their lives without any expectation because of their love for Kurdistan and freedom. PISHMERGAS are sacrificing their lives to pave the way for the future generation, and so the future Kurdish nation can live in peace, freedom and prosperity. This sense of sacrifice is now seen in the daily lifestyle and culture of every Kurd.

            Ordinary Kurds, sympathizing with and valuing PISHMERGA, have sung many patriotic songs and poems, named their children after martyrs and publicly, even though forbidden, have acknowledged their efforts. Consequently, to honour and recognize PISHMERGA, PDKI has named 26 of SARMAVEZ, the PISHMERGA Day.  On Sarmavez 26, 1945, the people of the city of Mahabad crushed the last military base of the monarchial central government of Iran; therefore, on this day, the Kurdish people, for the first time, enjoyed freedom and self-rule…

Dear Comrades,

            Now that the Kurdish struggle, particularly the armed struggle in other parts of the region is enjoying success, the name of PISHMERGA brings with itself hope to every Kurdish heart for a bright political future.  Having said that, it is also alleged that the armed struggle, particularly of the PDKI, has brought adversity to the Kurds in Iran.   It is also said that if PISHMERGA forces particularly those of PDKI, had not resisted the Iranian forces militarily, the destruction of Kurdish region in Iran, oppression and despotic behavior by the subsequent Iranian regimes would not had followed.  The Islamic Republic of Iran, therefore would have rebuilt the Kurdish region. The Kurds, particularly intellectuals, would have enjoyed more freedom and life in general would have been better for the ordinary Kurds.

            First of all, the Islamic regime of Iran has used these kinds of propaganda to wrongly represent itself like a regime with just values and fair principles. The regime to justify its destruction in Kurdistan has wrongly blamed the Kurdish armed resistance.

However, to the dismay of Iranian regime, the Kurdish people in Iran have a clear understanding of the regime and the Kurds know that the Islamic Regime of Iran is against their basic rights.  This kind of propaganda by the Islamic regime has backfired and many more patriots have joined the PISHMERGA force more than ever to fight the regime’s oppression.

We should remind ourselves that, although, the armed struggle of PISHMERGAS against the Islamic Republic of Iran has cost us many lives, however, it has been the most effective means of reviving the Kurdish identity in Iran.  The loss of a PISHMERGA, the destruction of a village by the regime ruling Iran and the pain of such a struggle have worked as an awakening call for the Kurds in Iran.  This has caused the Kurds in Iran to search and be more inquisitive about their national identity.  The Kurds in Iran now ask themselves; Why the clerics ruling Iran kill Kurds? Why the Kurdish farms being burned? Why Kurdish intellectuals face arrest? Why Kurdish Villages get destroyed? Why the Kurdish region is kept in a total calamity? Why Kurds are prevented from running their affairs? The Kurds know that all of these occur because of who they are.

            Patriotic feelings are growing within the Kurds; they have a sense of belonging to a nation, and more importantly the military resistance against the regime has actually caused the Kurdish people to renew their sense of identity for the first time in many years.

The Islamic regime started the oppression of minority rights from its reign to power, and crushed the uprising movements of Baluch, Turkmen and Arab minorities and their armed resistance simultaneously.  The question remains whether the minorities, which have had no military resistance against the central government of Iran, enjoy more rights than the Kurds that still have not given up their armed struggle against the central Islamic regime of Iran? Is their region more developed than Kurdistan? Are there more employment opportunity, factories and economic prosperity in their region compared to Kurdistan? Of course, the answer is no to all these questions.

On the other hand, thanks to the Kurdish armed resistance against the Islamic regime, there is a political maturity among the Kurds in Iran that is absent among other minorities in Iran.  The Kurds also recognize and struggle for their rights more than others, and have a stronger sense of nation-building; the Kurdish political parties are more advanced and Kurds are now certain to play a role in the future of Iran.

            Those who look at the political system in Iran superficially, allege that since the reduction of the Kurdish armed presence against the Islamic regime, the government has allowed more freedom of press and cultural activities, and as the results, intellectual expression has flourished.  One should realize that if there is a “change” in Iran, it is not because that the regime has democratized or it has started to respect the minorities’ rights, rather, this insufficient “change” is the product and the results of the political and bloody armed resistance that the Kurds have taken part in for years.  The Kurds in Iran have not laid down their arms, and if the Islamic regime has assured that the Kurds will do that one day, it will start to take back all the apparent “changes” that exists now. The Kurds do know that the Islamic regime with this perceived “change” is quietly attempting to control Kurdish youths and intellectuals and prevent Kurdish public from raising their voices.

 Let’s look at more examples;

            The TODEH party believed that the Islamic regime was anti-imperialism; therefore, it took all the necessary measures, including military campaign against the organizations, which opposed the regime, to ensure that the Islamic regime succeeds.  At last, it was eventually eliminated from the political scene in Iran.

            In order to further explain the attitude of the Islamic regime toward its citizens, a more deliberate scrutiny at portions of its record for the past 23 years is necessary:  Daryosh Feroher, his wife and tens of other writers and intellectuals were abducted, imprisoned and killed.  Shahpor Bekhteiar, Ferydon Ferrokhzad and many more were assassinated while living abroad.  One should ask, whether all these outspoken Iranians promote military resistance against the regime? Moreover, people like Abdullah Nori, Yosef Ashkeveri, Saeed Hejarian and tens of other Religious-Nationalists, not only opposed any armed action against the government, in contrary, at one time, they fought militarily for the regime to stand still.  They were all sentenced with extensive prison terms. Ayatollah Montezeri, who was the closest comrade of the founder of Islamic regime, Ayatollah Khomeni, has been under house arrest for years.

          Furthermore, the Kurdish freedom fighters do not fight the regime in cities of Tehran, Ghezveen and Ghom; instead, they resist the regime’s forces that come from those cities to occupy Kurdistan.  The military resistance, therefore, has been imposed on the Kurds and Kurdish freedom fighters.

          PDKI has been committed to a peaceful solution right from the beginning, and it has paid a big price for it; the Secretary-general of PDKI, Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was assassinated in Vienna in 1989 while “negotiating” with the regime.  The history of military resistance in Kurdistan does disclose the fact that there is a direct relation between the armed struggle and Kurdish nationalism; the region with the longest history of military resistance has the highest degree of Kurdish nationalism.

          Now that the Islamic regime has subjugated the Kurds by every means, at these sensitive circumstances Kurds must not restrict their resisting avenues, and should not overlook one method, including the military one over the others.  The Kurds must now engage further in cultural, diplomatic, political, organizational, artistic, scientific and many more methods of resisting and above all they must prepared themselves for one of the most effective method of resistance, the armed struggle. 

Those that allege that Kurdish misery is the result of Kurdish military struggle against the Islamic regime have not recognized the true face of the Islamic regime. The Kurdish intellectuals must now lead Kurds to a full recognition of their rights, and they must promote all kinds of struggle against the Islamic regime including the military one as well, if necessary.

The Islamic regime is not like democratic western governments elected by its people that work for the best interest of its citizens, rather, only the rights of the most powerful are respected; therefore, to take back their rights, the Kurds must also establish a powerful entity and generate methods aimed at supporting and enhancing their cause.  Certainly, this should include the build up of a strong and effective military force.

            PDKI respects all those who have fought against the Islamic regime of Iran. We respect and admire especially the Kurdish freedom fighters, PISHMERGAS.

Once again, happy PISHMERGA Day to you and to the PISHMERGA families and all the Kurdish people.

The Kurdistan Republic of 1946

Notes:
1. The Kurdish Republic of 1946 is also known as the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad because it was established in the town of Mahabad and its authority did not go beyond Mahabad and a few surrounding towns. Nevertheless, the Kurdish Republic of 1946 aimed at self-determination for all the Kurds of Iran. Therefore, the Kurdish Republic of 1946 is more appropriate.
2. Philip Robins, ‘The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue’, in International Affairs, Vol.69, No.4,1993 , p.671.
3. Louise L,Estrange Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of1946 , Cambridge University Press,1992 , p.1.
4. Borhanedin Yassin, ‘A History of the Republic of Kurdistan’, in The International Journal of Kurdish Studies, Vol.11, Nos.1-2,1997 , p.128.
5. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds,London, I.B. Tauris,1996 , p.237.
6. Sayyid Muhammad Samadi, JK Cibu, Ci Dewist ve Ci be Ser Hat (What was JK, What It Wanted and What Happened to It?, Mahabad,1981 , p.11.
7. Ibid., pp.12-13.
8. Chris Kutschera, Kurd le Sedey Nozde u Bistom da (Kurdish History in the19 th and20 th Centuries, p. 264(Kurdish translation by Muhammad Riyani).
9. Jalil Gadani, Pencah Sal Xebat: Kurteyek li Mijoyi Hizbi Dimokrati Kurdistani Iran [Fifty Years Struggle: A Short History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan, The Ministry of Education’s Publication, [1987], p. 21(Kurdish).
10. Ibid., p.28.
11. John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, No Friends but the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds, London, Viking,1992 , p.106.
12. Dana/Muhammad Biha’addin Mella Sahib, Qazi Muhemmed u Kumari Mahabad [Qazi Muhammad and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, Suleimaniyeh, Raperin Publications,1970 , p. 29(Kurdish).
13. Sayyid Muhammad Samadi, op.cit., p.15.
14. Archie Roosevelt Jnr., ‘The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad’, in Gerard Chaliand (ed.) People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, London, Zed Press,1978 , p.141.
15. A. Ghassemlou, ‘Kurdistan in Iran’, in Gerard Chaliand (ed.) People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, London, Zed Press,1980 , p.120.
16. Abdurrahman Qasemlo, Kurdistan and Kurds, APEC-Forlag,1996 , p. 95(translated into Persian by Taha Atiqi).
17. Chris Kutschera, op.cit., p.271.
18. Amir Taheri, The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution, Maryland (USA), Adler Publishers Inc.1986 , pp.129-132.
19. The government formed in Iranian Azerbaijan was a communist government, and there also was racial and linguistic affinities between the Soviet and Iranian Azeris.
20. Archie Roosevelt Jnr., ‘The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad’, in Gerard Chaliand (ed.) op.cit., p.143.
21. Nader Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism, Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers,1992 , p.16.
22. Dana/Muhammad Biha’addin Mella Sahib, op.cit., p.45.
23. Chris Kutschera, op.cit., p.284.
24. Edgar O’balance, The Kurdish Struggle1920 -94, London, MacMillan Press Ltd.,1996 , p.32.
25. Peyam, ‘An Important Historical Document’, Peyam Newspaper, Issue: 6 March1998 , pp.1, 2(Kurdish).
26. Archie Roosevelt Jnr., ‘The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad’, in Gerard Chaliand (ed.), op.cit., p.149.

Press Review:

IRAN'S DISTANT 'SECOND REVOLUTION'

By Stephen C. Fairbanks

Iranian officials this week once again are vainly trying to rekindle revolutionary fervor as the country marks the 24^th anniversary of the Islamic revolution. They are mobilizing crowds of conscripts, low-level bureaucrats, and other heerleaders to commemorate the "Ten Days of Dawn," the days of revolutionary transition that began with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's 1
February 1979 return to Iran. But many Iranians are simmering with discontent, and the conservative clerics wielding the reins of power have lost the legitimacy they once derived from public support. The revolution's moral, social, and economic promises remain undelivered by a corrupt and dysfunctional government. But if the revolution has failed, there are no prospects on the horizon for its overturn. Many outside Iran expected otherwise when university students across the country last November and December protested the death penalty against outspoken liberal professor Hashem Aghajari. At the same time, the power struggle between the regime's major factions was intensifying and perennial hopes for a "second revolution" soared, at least among Western journalists and a few Washington officials. Some Iranian expatriates used satellite television to urge their fellow countrymen to join the students, but few did so other than those who went to make sure that their children did not get arrested.
            Political apathy once again dominates Iran's mood. The public's enthusiasm for new political upheaval appears to be no greater than its long-faded zeal for the Islamic revolution.  One reason the student activists failed to attract wider support is that Aghajari's death sentence was simply not an issue that affects most people's lives. It was dreadful to be sure, even if it has not been carried out, but most people have gotten used to the harsh judgments and penalties (although rarely death sentences) imposed by the conservative courts against Islamic modernists and reform-minded activists.

Similarly, few Iranians consider that the relentless economic stresses of life in the Islamic Republic warrant mounting an open challenge to the regime. The steep housing prices and pervasive corruption, the high rates of unemployment and inflation, and other chronic problems wrought by governmental economic mismanagement could breed widespread discontent, but Iranians are used to gradually worsening daily living conditions. They have not been hit by the sort of sudden economic catastrophe, such as a steep drop in oil prices, that would be much more likely to breed serious unrest.

            As for the so-called student movement, expectations in the West that it poses a serious threat to the regime are clearly too high. Compared to their counterparts in the United States, Iranian university students are keenly interested in politics, but those willing to put their academic futures on the line by joining in demonstrations are relatively few. Western journalists covering the demonstrations of late last year reported fewer than 5,000 participants at the largest rallies. That does not amount to much in a total university population exceeding 1 million.

There is no nationwide coordinating mechanism that would make the students an effective force.  The main student organization on most campuses, the Office for Strengthening Unity, may enable students to air views on some controversial issues, but ultimately it functions to support the ruling order. It secures official permits for student demonstrations in apparent return for ensuring that the students do not get out of hand. The student protests against Aghajari's death sentence were tolerated, but chants of "Death to Khamenei" are not, and the student-organization leaders try to prevent such occurrences.

Without independent institutions, civil society cannot be established, and no viable opposition can develop. Institutions in such civil sectors as education, religion, labor, law, and women's rights, like the students' Office for Strengthening Unity, are connected to the government, either through direct funding or by intimidation. There is at present no means for workers to generate a general strike, nor is it yet possible for the more modernist, dissident clerics to become an organized threat when their seminaries in Qom are government-connected.

The government, although driven by factional conflict, is not on the brink of collapse. The two main political trends remain in a deadlock that keeps the conservatives in power and the reformists perpetually frustrated. The conservatives have no popular legitimacy and no hopes of winning elections in the manner that President Khatami and the reformist parliamentarians have, but they hold all the coercive reins of power and are constantly able to thwart reform efforts.

In a political maneuver meant to give an appearance of fighting back, President Khatami last year proposed two bills that would strengthen him vis-à-vis the conservative judiciary and curtail the Guardians Council's role in vetting election candidates. The council is certain to reject the bills if they ever emerge from parliament. It is doubtful that Khatami, who rarely speaks about the two bills now, feels seriously enough about them to resign in the event of their rejection, as some reformists say he should. Khatami has not carried out his own, earlier threats to resign during his troubled presidency. Above all he wants to avoid fomenting domestic chaos. In his view, according to reformists disillusioned with him, order is more important than freedom.

Disillusionment with Khatami is now widespread, and at present the outlook for political reform is grim. Some conservatives talk of closing remaining reformist newspapers and of disbanding major reformist parties such as the Islamic Iran Participation Party, one of whose leaders, Abbas Abdi, was sentenced to eight years in prison this week. A U.S.-led war with Iraq could make the situation worse if, as reformists fear, conservatives adduce domestic security needs in order to further crush Iran's democratic impulse.

Wednesday, February 5, 2003 - The International Herald Tribune

Few Iranians celebrated the 24th anniversary on Saturday of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's return to Iran. It is easy to understand why. A movement that once brought millions into the streets demanding freedom from the shah's dictatorship has gone on to oppress its young, disillusion its middle-aged veterans and silence even grand ayatollahs who question its course.

Two recent events illustrate the growing isolation of the clerical conservatives who retain real power in Iran despite the repeated electoral victories of reformers.  On Sunday, Tehran newspapers reported that a leading reform strategist had been sentenced to seven years in prison for publishing a poll showing that three in four Iranians favor talks with Washington. That same reformer, Abbas Abdi, was one of the students who led the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979, holding diplomats hostage for more than a year.

And last week Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri was freed after five years of house arrest for questioning the course taken by Iran since the revolution. Montazeri, 80, was once Khomeini's closest associate and designated successor.  Abdi and Montazeri are personally responsible for some of the harsh cruelty of the Islamic Republic's early years. Since then each has come to recognize the damage that clerical dictatorship has done to Iran's people and its place in the world. Abdi has courageously fought for reform for more than a decade and has been imprisoned before. Montazeri has been speaking out fearlessly since the late 1980s and resumed doing so as soon as he was released. No such evolution has occurred among the ruling clerical establishment, and none is in sight.

The biggest threat to continued clerical dictatorship comes from young Iranians. Most of Iran's 65 million people were born after the revolution, and more than 70 percent are under 30. For them the rule of the mullahs has meant stunted job and housing prospects, furtive social lives and universities under siege from religious courts and paramilitary thugs.  These young people will eventually shape Iran's future. For now, they have lodged their hopes in the presidency of Mohammed Khatami and its long-thwarted promises of reform. The mullahs believe that by jailing people like Abbas Abdi they can delay needed changes indefinitely. They are wrong.

In Brief:

The 8th Party Plenum

The 8^th Plenum of Central Committee of PDKI was conducted on 19 January 2003 with the participation of the majority of leadership members that lasted for 5 days.  In the 1^st part of the sessions, the agenda of Plenum that was presented by Politburo was discussed.  Following the report, the Secretary-general in his political analysis briefed the participants on the general circumstances of Iran and the Kurds, and the changes that have occurred between the two plenums.

In the analysis, poverty, unemployment of the people on one side, and negligence and incompatibility of the officials on the other to deal with these issues that has resulted in burglary, corruption and other social problems, were laid out.  Student movement and regime’s isolation from main stream society were also discussed.  The need for a united front of progressive forces of Iran was also a major topic of Plenum that the Party should play a leading role.

Plenum touched on the regional issues that along with being prepared for any new developments, hoped that the disputes and issues in the region are solved peacefully.

Severe economic conditions burry people under avalanche

The Kurdish areas in Iran are mountainous with plenty of snow and cold winters.  Kurdish merchants to make daily living, cross the ‘illegal’ borders into neighbouring Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey, but the authorities do not legalize the trade nor do they allow them to freely work.  As the result people will have to choose rough mountains for their trade, which has been tragic for them.  In Sardasht region, nine people were buried under an avalanch killing 5 of them.  In Mahabad three people were killed under avalanche.  In Piranshar, 90 merchants, choosing a rough path avoiding their visibility, were buried under an avalanche that resulted in the freezing to death of four and the rest were in critical condition.  The AP reporting an avalanche in central Iran stated that in other parts of Iran “local authorities have failed to put sufficient safety measures in place along the avalanche-prone road, where many people have been killed over the years.”

The Participation of a PDKI delegation at NDP Convention in Canada

The 21^st federal Convention of New Democratic Party of Canada (NDP) was conducted on 24 to 26 of January 2003 in Toronto, Canada. In this Convention along with discussing many domestic and international issues, a new leader was elected.  An invited PDKI delegation led by Sharif Behruz, Director of Public Relation in Ontario, Canada accompanied by Sirus Almasi in charge of Party affairs in Toronto participated at Convention.  NDP is a member of Socialist International, which PDKI is also a member.

Messages of Solidarity:

More Political Executions in Iran

The Islamic regime of Iran executed Mohammad Golabi(m), in  the prison of Saghez, Kurdistan province in 2 March 2003.   Association of Iranian Political Prisoners (in Exile) in its communiqué stated that Mohammad Golabi was arrested on 26 July 1999, accused of being politically active in connection with Komala organization. He was reportedly ill-treated and tortured severely while in detention.  It has been reported that his death sentence was not upheld by Supreme Court when he was executed.  ”Godini, public prosecutor of the city, tortured Mohammad personally and threatened to kill him by putting a gun on his temple several times.

Mohammad complained against him to the public prosecutor of the province. ”Godin” threatened to execute him if he does not back up from his complain.   Mohammad was married and had 4 children.

 The organizations also reported that Sassan Al-Kanan(m), aged 35, was also executed in the prison of Sanandaj , the capital of Kurdistan province in 19 February 2003.  In 5 January 2003, Branch 1 of the Islamic “Revolutionary" Court in Sanandaj sentenced Sassan to death on various charges, including "acting against state security" and "supporting Komala Organization”. Sassan denied all the charges during interrogation and hearing. The sentence upheld by Supreme Court on 10 February 2003.  Sassan was not given a chance to appeal and his lawyer was not informed about the process of the sentence confirmation. The execution of Sassan carried out while a group of UN Human rights inspectors are visiting Iran and the mother of Sassan was in Tehran trying to meet with them for the sake of his son.

AFP also confirmed that “Iran has executed two members of an outlawed leftist Kurdish rebel group” according to a justice official.  AFP also adds that Iran has expressed concern about renewed unrest among its six-million-strong Kurdish minority if any US-led invasion of neighbouring Iraq leads to greater autonomy for its Kurdish community.

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